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Secure Multiuser Communications in Multiple
Amplify-and-Forward Relay Networks
Lisheng Fan, Xianfu Lei, Trung Q. Duong, Senior Member, IEEE, Maged Elkashlan, Member, IEEE, and George
K. Karagiannidis, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract— This paper proposes relay selection in order to
increase the physical layer security in multiuser cooperative relay
networks with multiple amplify-and-forward (AF) relays, in the
presence of multiple eavesdroppers. To strengthen the network
security against eavesdropping attack, we present three criteria to
select the best relay and user pair. Specifically, criterion I and II
study the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the receivers, and
perform the selection by maximizing the SNR ratio of the user to
the eavesdroppers. To this end, criterion I relies on both the main
and eavesdropper links, while criterion II relies on the main links
only. Criterion III is the standard max-min selection criterion,
which maximizes the minimum of the dual-hop channel gains of
main links. For the three selection criteria, we examine the system
secrecy performance by deriving the analytical expressions for
the secrecy outage probability. We also derive the asymptotic
analysis for the secrecy outage probability with high main-to-
eavesdropper ratio (MER). From the asymptotic analysis, an
interesting observation is reached: for each criterion, the system
diversity order is equivalent to the number of relays regardless
of the number of users and eavesdroppers.
Index Terms— Multiuser communications, multi-relay cooper-
ative networks, multiple eavesdroppers, physical layer security,
secrecy outage probability
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless transmission, the
eavesdroppers in the wireless communications can overhear
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the message and hence bring out the severe issue of security.
To prevent the wiretap, the physical layer security has been
considered to implement the information-theoretical secure
transmission. In [1], the wiretap model was first introduced
by Wyner to study the secrecy rate. After this work, research
in this direction picked up momentum by extending and ana-
lyzing the secrecy performance over different fading channels
[2]–[8]. Specifically, the authors in [2] and [3] have considered
that the main and eavesdropper links undergo independent
Rayleigh fading, and studied the secrecy capacity. In [4]
and [5], the authors have considered the correlated Rayleigh
fading between the main and eavesdropper links, and analyzed
the impact of channel correlation on the secrecy capacity
and outage probability. In [6]–[8], the authors have studied
the secrecy performance over Rician and Nakagami-m fading
channels.
To enhance the secrecy performance of wireless communi-
cations, selection technique has been widely used [9]–[12].
For the communication system with multiple antennas at
the transmitter, antenna selection can be used to exploit the
fluctuation of fading channels among antennas. Specifically,
the authors in [9] have studied the effect of transmit antenna
selection on the security of a multiple-input single-output
(MISO) system, and developed analytical expression of the
secrecy outage probability. The results in [9] have shown that
the transmit antenna selection can considerably enhance the
system security. In [10] and [11], the authors have proposed
transmit antenna selection in a multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) system to enhance the system security, and presented
the analytical and asymptotic expressions of secrecy outage
probability. For the multiuser communication system, user
selection can be performed to exploit the channel fluctuation
among users, in order to enhance the system security. For
example, the authors in [12] have investigated the problem
of user selection and resource allocation for the secure mul-
tiuser downlink MISO orthogonal frequency division multiple
access (MISO-OFDMA) system, and devised the system by
maximizing the secrecy rate.
Besides selection technique, relaying technique can also
improve the secrecy performance of wireless communica-
tions [13]–[25]. Some fundamental relaying protocols such
as amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF)
relaying can be applied in the physical layer security sys-
tems [26]–[31]. In [26], the authors have studied the secrecy
performance of the cooperative DF relaying networks, and
analyzed the impact of relay placement on the secrecy outage
probability. For cooperative relaying networks with multiple
2DF relays, relay selection can be applied to enhance the
system security performance [27]–[30]. In [31], the authors
have studied the cooperative secure beamforming for AF
relaying networks in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
In [22]–[24], H.-M. Wang et.al proposed joint beamforming
and jamming schemes to enhance the security of both one-way
and two-way relay networks., which led to a breakthrough
in the field of physical-layer secure design for cooperative
relay systems. Recently, the authors in [30] have studied the
secrecy performance of the cooperative relaying networks with
multiple AF relays, and analyzed the effect of relay selection
on the intercept probability. However, the intercept probability
is a special case of secrecy outage probability when the target
secrecy date rate is set to zero, and it only depends on the
second-hop relaying channels of the main and eavesdropper
links. In other words, the first-hop relaying channels do not
affect the relay selection criterion in [30], which simplifies
the selection criterion and related performance analysis. To
the best of our knowledge, no prior work has considered the
effect of multiple AF relay selection on the secrecy outage
probability of relaying networks.
In this paper, we consider a multiuser cooperative relaying
network with M trusted AF relays in the presence of multiple
eavesdroppers, and we study the effect of relay selection
on the system secrecy outage probability. We present three
selection criteria to select one best relay and user pair, in
order to enhance the system security. Specifically, criterion
I and II study the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at
the receivers, and perform the selection by maximizing the
SNR ratio of the user to the eavesdroppers. To this end,
criterion I relies on both the main and eavesdropper links,
while criterion II relies on the main links only. Criterion III
is the standard max-min selection criterion, which maximizes
the minimum of the dual-hop channel gains of main links.
For each criterion, we derive the analytical expression for the
secrecy outage probability as well as the asymptotic expression
with high main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER). The asymptotic
analysis reveals that the system diversity order is equal to
M , regardless of the selection criterion. The diversity order
is also independent of the number of users and eavesdroppers.
Numerical and simulation results are demonstrated to verify
the proposed studies.
Notation: The notation CN (0, σ2) denotes a circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian random variable (RV) with zero
mean and variance σ2. We use fX(·) and FX(·) to represent
the probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distri-
bution function (CDF) of RV X , respectively. The function
K1(x) denotes the first-order modified Bessel function of the
second kind [32, (8.407)] and Γ(x) is the Gamma function
[32]. Notation Pr[·] returns the probability.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1 depicts the system model of the two-phase multiuser
multi-relay cooperative network with multiple eavesdroppers
EK
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Fig. 1. Two-phase multiuser multi-relay cooperative network with multiple
eavesdroppers.
1. The system consists of a base station BS, M trusted AF
relays, and N desired users as well as K eavesdroppers. We
consider severe shadowing environment so that the direct links
do not exist. The data transmission from the BS to the users
can only travel via the relays, with the possible wiretap from
K eavesdroppers. We assume that the eavesdroppers can coop-
erate with each other by employing maximal ratio combining
(MRC) technique to increase the wiretap probability. Although
this assumption may involve an increased complexity, partic-
ularity in distributed scenarios of eavesdroppers, it presents
the extreme case from the secure communication viewpoint
[35]. To prevent the wiretap, we select the best relay and user
pair (Rm∗ , Dn∗) to enhance the system security performance,
while the other relays and users keep silent 2. All nodes in
the network are equipped with a single antenna due to size
limitation, and they operate in a half-duplex mode. In this
work, we assume the error-free channel estimation, where the
estimation method can be found the literature such as [15]–
[17], [36], [37].
Suppose that the m-th relay and n-th user have been selected
for data transmission, and PS and PR denote the transmit
power at the BS and relay, respectively. In the first phase, BS
sends normalized signal s to Rm, while Rm receives
yRm =
√
PShBS,Rms+ nR, (1)
where hBS,Rm ∼ CN (0, α) denotes the channel of the
BS→Rm link, and nR ∼ CN (0, 1) is the additive white noise
1The considered system model is practically applicable for the downlink
communication of cellular networks. The utilization of multi-relay and mul-
tiuser provides both cooperative and multiuser diversity, which significantly
improve the system outage probability and throughput [33], [34]. Moreover,
multiple eavesdroppers may arise from realistic scenarios in which the
malicious nodes are attempting to attack the legitimate destinations [25], [31].
2In this work, we assume that the residual (M − 1) relays and (N −
1) users keep silent. This assumption has been widely used in the existing
literature such as [9]–[11], [15], [17]–[18]. In some communication scenarios,
these silent nodes can be active to send artificial noise to enhance the system
security, at the cost of more implementation complexity. The utilization of
artificial noise is beyond the scope of this paper and will be investigated in
our future work.
3at the relay. Then relay Rm amplifies the received signal yRm
by a factor κ,
κ =
√
PR
PS |hBS,Rm |2 + 1
, (2)
and forwards the resultant signal in the second phase. User
Dn and eavesdropper Ek respectively receive
yDm,n = hRm,Dnκy
R
m + nD, (3)
yEm,k = hRm,Ekκy
R
m + nE , (4)
where hRm,Dn ∼ CN (0, β) and hRm,Ek ∼ CN (0, ε) denote
the channels of Rm→Dn and Rm→Ek links, respectively.
Notations nD ∼ CN (0, 1) and nE ∼ CN (0, 1) are the additive
white noise at the user and eavesdropper, respectively. From
(1)–(3), the received SNR at Dn is obtained as
SNRDm,n =
PSPRumvm,n
PSum + PRvm,n + 1
, (5)
where um = |hBS,Rm |2 and vm,n = |hRm,Dn |2 denote the
instantaneous channel gains of the BS→Rm and Rm→Dn
links, respectively. To increase the wiretap probability, the
eavesdroppers combine the received signals yEm,k with MRC
3 to obtain a scalar symbol as [38]
yEn =
K∑
k=1
h†Rm,Eky
E
m,k =
K∑
k=1
|hRm,Ek |2κyRm + h†Rm,EknE ,
(6)
where † denotes the conjugate transpose operation. From
the above equation, we can obtain the received SNR of K
eavesdroppers with MRC as [38]
SNREm =
PSPRumwm
PSum + PRwm + 1
, (7)
where wm =
∑K
k=1 |hRm,Ek |2 denotes the sum channel gain
of the K eavesdropper links.
For the considered system with target secrecy data rate
Rs, the secrecy outage event occurs when the instantaneous
capacity difference between the main and eavesdropper links
falls below Rs. Accordingly, the secrecy outage probability
with the m-th relay and n-th user is given by
Pout,m,n = Pr
[
1
2
log2(1 + SNR
D
m,n)
− 1
2
log2(1 + SNR
E
m) < Rs
]
(8)
= Pr
(
1 + SNRDm,n
1 + SNREm
< γth
)
, (9)
where γth = 22Rs denotes the secrecy SNR threshold.
3In this paper, we consider a worse-case scenario where malicious nodes
can cooperate via MRC to form a group of colluding eavesdroppers [35]. The
MRC technique can be implemented by gathering all the received signals
and required channel information from eavesdroppers through a dedicated
feedback channel.
III. RELAY AND USER SELECTION
For the considered system, we select the best relay and user
pair (Rm∗ , Dn∗) to minimize the secrecy outage probability,
(m∗, n∗) = arg min
m=1,··· ,M
min
n=1,··· ,N
Pout,m,n (10)
= arg min
m=1,··· ,M
min
n=1,··· ,N
Pr
(
1 + SNRDm,n
1 + SNREm
< γth
)
.
(11)
It holds that
1 + SNRDm,n
1 + SNREm
' SNR
D
m,n
SNREm
(12)
=
PSPRumvm,n/(PSum + PRvm,n + 1)
PSPRumwm/(PSum + PRwm + 1)
(13)
' PSPRumvm,n/(PSum + PRvm,n)
PSPRumwm/(PSum + PRwm)
(14)
where in (12) we apply the approximation of (1 + x)/(1 +
y) ' x/y . This approximation has been used in [4], [28],
[29], and the effect of approximation error can be neglected
in high SNR region. In addition, we apply the approximation
of xy/(1 + x + y) ' xy/(x + y) in (14), where the effect
of approximation error can be also ignored for large transmit
power [39]. Let η = PRPS denote the transmit power ratio of
the relay to the BS. Then we can summarize
1 + SNRDm,n
1 + SNREm
' (um + ηwm)vm,n
(um + ηvm,n)wm
, (15)
Accordingly, we can approximate Pout,m,n using (15) as
Pout,m,n ' Pr
[
(um + ηwm)vm,n
(um + ηvm,n)wm
< γth
]
. (16)
Note that (um+ηwm)vm,n(um+ηvm,n)wm < γth is equivalent to (um +
ηwm)vm,n < (um + ηvm,n)γthwm, which can be simplified
as umvm,n < (γthum + (γth − 1)ηvm,n)wm. Hence, we can
further write Pout,m,n as
Pout,m,n ' Pr [umvm,n < (γthum + (γth − 1)ηvm,n)wm]
(17)
= Pr
[
umvm,n
γthum + (γth − 1)ηvm,n < wm
]
. (18)
We then devise a relay and user pair selection criterion as
(m∗, n∗) = arg max
m=1,··· ,M
max
n=1,··· ,N(
umvm,n/(γthum + (γth − 1)ηvm,n)
wm
)
. (19)
From (16)–(18), one can easily conclude that the criterion
in (19) is equivalent to maximizing the received SNR ratio
of the user to the eavesdroppers based on both the main
and eavesdropper links, and hence it achieves a near-optimal
secrecy outage performance with large transmit power.
Note that the near-optimal selection in (19) mandates the
knowledge of the instantaneous channel parameters of both
the main and eavesdropper links. In some communication
4scenarios, it may be however impractical or cost-consuming
to acquire the instantaneous channel parameters of the eaves-
dropper links. In this case, the relay and user selection can
only depend on the instantaneous channel parameters of main
links. By applying
umvm,n/(γthum + (γth − 1)ηvm,n) ≤ min( um(γth − 1)η ,
vm,n
γth
)
(20)
into (19), we can devise a sub-optimal relay and user selection
criterion as
(m∗, n∗) = arg max
m=1,··· ,M
max
n=1,··· ,N
min
(
um
(γth − 1)η ,
vm,n
γth
)
,
(21)
which maximizes the received SNR ratio of the user to the
eavesdroppers based only on the main links.
In addition, according to the standard max-min criterion, we
select the relay and user pair by maximizing the minimum of
the dual-hop channel gains of main links as
(m∗, n∗) = arg max
m=1,··· ,M
max
n=1,··· ,N
min(um, vm,n). (22)
For convenience of notation, we will refer to the selection
criterion in (19), (21) and (22) as criterion I, II, and III,
respectively. For each of the three criteria, we will first derive
analytical expressions for the secrecy outage probability, we
then provide asymptotic expressions with high MER, from
which we obtain the system diversity order.
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section, we will derive the analytical expression of
secrecy outage probability for criterion I, II and III. From (18),
the system secrecy outage probability with selected Rm∗ and
Dn∗ for high transmit power is given by
Pout,m∗,n∗ ' Pr(Zm∗,n∗ < wm∗), (23)
where the approximation sign comes from the assumption of
large transmit power which was previously used in eq. (15),
and Zm,n is
Zm,n =
umvm,n
γthum + (γth − 1)ηvm,n . (24)
A. Criterion I
According to the selection criterion in (19), we find that
the statistic Zm∗,n∗/wm∗ is the maximum of the M × N
variables {Zm,n/wm}. However, these M × N variables are
not independent of each other, since N users share the com-
mon BS-relay link for a given relay. This non-independence
causes some difficulty to the performance analysis. To solve
this troublesome, we turn our attention to view Zm∗,n∗/wm∗
as the maximum of M variables {Zm,n∗m/wm}, where Dn∗m
is the best user conditioned on a given relay Rm. These M
variables are independent of each other, since each relay has
independent links with other nodes in the network. Hence, we
need first to study the secrecy outage probability for a given
relay Rm with only user selection.
Note that Zm,n in (24) increases with vm,n, the best user
Dn∗m conditioned on a given relay Rm should be selected to
maximize vm,n,
n∗m = arg max
n=1,··· ,N
vm,n. (25)
The probability density function (PDF) of vm,n∗m is [40,
(9E.2)]
fvm,n∗m (v) =
N∑
n=1
(−1)n−1
(
N
n
)
n
β
e−
nv
β . (26)
Using (26), the cumulative density function (CDF) of Zm,n∗m
can be written as
FZm,n∗m (z) = Pr
(
umvm,n∗m
γthum + (γth − 1)ηvm,n∗m
< z
)
(27)
= Pr
[
um(vm,n∗m − γthz) < (γth − 1)ηvm,n∗mz
]
.
(28)
By considering two cases of vm,n∗m ≤ γthz and vm,n∗m > γthz
respectively, we can further write FZm,n∗m (z) as
FZm,n∗m (z) = Pr(vm,n∗m ≤ γthz)
+ Pr
(
vm,n∗m > γthz, um <
(γth − 1)ηvm,n∗mz
vm,n∗m − γthz
)
.
(29)
By applying the PDF of vm,n∗m in eq. (26) and fum(u) =
1
αe
− uα into the above equation, and then solving the required
integral, we obtain the CDF of Zm,n∗m as
FZm,n∗m (z) = 1−
N∑
n=1
(−1)n−1
(
N
n
)
bne
−(nγthβ +
η(γth−1)
α )z
× zK1(bnz), (30)
where we apply [32, (3.324)] and
bn =
√
4nηγth(γth − 1)
αβ
. (31)
From eqs. (23) and (30), we derive the closed-form expression
of the secrecy outage probability with the m-th relay for large
transmit power as
Pout,m,n∗m ' Pr(Zm,n∗m < wm) (32)
=
∫ ∞
0
fwm(w)FZm,n∗m (w)dw, (33)
where the approximation sign in eq. (32) comes from the
assumption of large transmit power which was previously used
in eq. (15). Note that fwm(w) =
wK−1
Γ(K)εK
e−
w
ε is the PDF of
wm [40, (9.5)], we can obtain the secrecy outage probability
with the m-th relay by applying [32, (6.621.3)] as
Pout,m,n∗m ' 1−
N∑
n=1
(−1)n−1
(
N
n
)
2
√
pib2nΓ(K + 2)
εK(bn + cn)K+2Γ(K + 32 )
× 2F1(K + 2, 32 ,K +
3
2
;
cn − bn
cn + bn
), (34)
5where cn = 1ε+
nγth
β +
η(γth−1)
α and 2F1(·) denotes the Gauss
hypergeometric function [32, (9.100)] 4.
As mentioned at the beginning of Sec. IV. A, the statistic
Zm∗,n∗/wm∗ is the maximum of M independent variables of
{Zm,n∗m/wm}, and hence we can obtain the secrecy outage
probability for criterion I with high transmit power as
Pout,m∗,n∗ '
[
1−
N∑
n=1
(
N
n
)
2(−1)n−1√pib2nΓ(K + 2)
εK(bn + cn)K+2Γ(K + 32 )
× 2F1(K + 2, 32 ,K +
3
2
;
cn − bn
cn + bn
)
]M
. (35)
B. Criterion II and III
In this subsection, we derive the secrecy outage probability
for criterion II and III in a unified manner. Note that criterion
II and III in (21) and (22) can be unified as
(m∗, n∗) = arg max
m=1,··· ,M
max
n=1,··· ,N
min(um, ρvm,n), (36)
where ρ = ρII and ρ = ρIII correspond to criterion II and III,
respectively, with ρII =
(γth−1)η
γth
and ρIII = 1. According to
(36), we obtain the CDFs of um∗ and vm∗,n∗ in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: The CDFs of um∗ and vm∗,n∗ are given by
Fum∗ (x) = 1−
N∑
n=1
∑˜
i
(
q1ie
−q2ix + q3ie−
x
α
)
Fvm∗,n∗ (x) = 1−
N∑
n=1
∑˜
i
(
q4i
q2iρ
e−q2iρx +
q5iβ
n
e−
n
β x
) ,
(37)
where
q1i =M(−1)n−1
(
N
n
)
diei
α(ei + nρβ )(ei +
1
α +
n
ρβ )
q2i = ei +
1
α
+
n
ρβ
q3i =M(−1)n−1
(
N
n
)
ndi
n+ eiρβ
q4i =M(−1)n−1
(
N
n
)
ndiei
β(ei + 1α )
q5i =M(−1)n−1
(
N
n
)
ndi
β(1 + αei)
,
(38)
4Note that the Gauss hypergeometric function can be computed in Matlab or
Mathematica. This function can be also efficiently calculated by the represen-
tation of some elementary functions. For example, 2F1(K+2, 32 ,K+
3
2
; z)
with K = 1 can be calculated as 3[
√
z(z+1)−(z−1)2 tanh−1(√z)]
8(z−1)2z
3
2
[32], [41].
with
∑˜
i
=
M−1∑
i1=0
i1∑
i2=0
i2∑
i3=0
· · ·
iN−1∑
iN=0
di = (−1)i1+i2+···+iN (M−1i1 )(i1i2) · · · (
iN−1
iN
)
×((N1 ))i1−i2((N2 ))i2−i3 · · · ((NN−1))iN−1−iN
ei =
i1
α
+
i1 + · · ·+ iN
ρβ
. (39)
Proof : See Appendix I.
From Theorem 1, we now extend to analyze the CDF of
Zm∗,n∗ =
um∗vm∗,n∗
γthum∗+(γth−1)ηvm∗,n∗ as
FZm∗,n∗ (z) = Pr
(
um∗vm∗,n∗
γthum∗ + (γth − 1)ηvm∗,n∗ < z
)
(40)
= Pr [um∗(vm∗,n∗ − γthz) < (γth − 1)ηvm∗,n∗z]
(41)
= Pr(vm∗,n∗ ≤ γthz)
+ Pr
[
vm∗,n∗ > γthz, u <
(γth − 1)ηvm∗,n∗z
vm∗,n∗ − γthz
]
.
(42)
Applying the results of Theorem 1 into the above equation
yields the CDF of Zm∗,n∗ as
FZm∗,n∗ (z) = 1−
N∑
n1
N∑
n2=1
∑˜
i
∑˜
j
[
q5iq1jβψ1
n1
z
× e−[ η1γthβ +q2jη(γth−1)]zK1(ψ1z)
+
q5iq3jβψ2
n1
ze−[
n1γth
β +
(γth−1)η
α ]zK1(ψ2z)
+
q4iq1jψ3
ρq2i
ze−[q2iργth+q2jη(γth−1)]zK1(ψ3z)
+
q4iq3jψ4
ρq2i
ze−[ρq2iγth+
(γth−1)η
α ]zK1(ψ4z)
]
,
(43)
with 
ψ1 =
√
4n1q2jηγth(γth − 1)
β
ψ2 =
√
4n1ηγth(γth − 1)
αβ
ψ3 =
√
4q2iq2jρηγth(γth − 1)
ψ4 =
√
4ρq2iηγth(γth − 1)
α
. (44)
The system secrecy outage probability is then derived as
Pout,m∗,n∗ ' Pr(Zm∗,n∗ < wm∗) (45)
=
∫ ∞
0
fwm∗ (w)FZm∗,n∗ (w)dw. (46)
Note that for criterion II and III, the eavesdropper links are
not involved in the relay and user selection. Hence we obtain
6that fwm∗ (w) =
wK−1
Γ(K)εK
e−
w
ε [40, (9.5)]. Applying fwm∗ (w)
into (46) yields
Pout,m∗,n∗ ' 1−
N∑
n1=1
N∑
n2=1
∑˜
i
∑˜
j
2
√
piΓ(K + 2)
Γ(K + 32 )ε
K
×
[
q5iq1jβψ
2
1
n1(ψ1 + τ1)K+2
2F1(K + 2,
3
2
,K +
3
2
;
τ1 − ψ1
τ1 + ψ1
)
+
q5iq3jβψ
2
2
n1(ψ2 + τ2)K+2
2F1(K + 2,
3
2
,K +
3
2
;
τ2 − ψ2
τ2 + ψ2
)
+
q4iq1jψ
2
3
ρq2i(ψ3 + τ3)K+2
2F1(K + 2,
3
2
,K +
3
2
;
τ3 − ψ3
τ3 + ψ3
)
+
q4iq3jψ
2
4
ρq2i(ψ4 + τ4)K+2
2F1(K + 2,
3
2
,K +
3
2
;
τ4 − ψ4
τ4 + ψ4
)
]
,
(47)
where 
τ1 =
1
ε
+
n1γth
β
+ q2jη(γth − 1)
τ2 =
1
ε
+
n1γth
β
+
(γth − 1)η
α
τ3 =
1
ε
+ q2iργth + q2jη(γth − 1)
τ4 =
1
ε
+ q2iργth +
(γth − 1)η
α
. (48)
By setting ρ = ρII and ρ = ρIII into (47), we can obtain the
analytical expression of secrecy outage probability for criterion
II and III, respectively.
V. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the asymptotic secrecy outage
probability for the three selection criteria with high MER.
From the asymptotic expressions, we further reveal the system
diversity order for the three criteria.
A. Criterion I
To analyze the diversity gain of criterion I, we firstly
consider the lower and upper bounds of Zm,n∗m as
0.5min
(
um
(γth − 1)η ,
vm,n∗m
γth
)
≤ Zm,n∗m
≤ min
(
um
(γth − 1)η ,
vm,n∗m
γth
)
. (49)
The above bounds can be written in a unified form as
Zbm,n∗m = δmin
(
um
(γth − 1)η ,
vm,n∗m
γth
)
, (50)
where δ = 0.5 and δ = 1 correspond to the lower and upper
bounds of Zm,n∗m , respectively. From Z
b
m,n∗m
, we can derive
the asymptotic Pout,m,n∗m with high MER in the following
theorem,
Theorem 2: The asymptotic expression of Pout,m,n∗m in the
high MER region is given by
P asyout,m,n∗m =

K
λ
[
(γth − 1)ηβ
δα
+
γth
δ
]
, If N = 1
K
λ
(γth − 1)ηβ
δα
, If N ≥ 2
,
(51)
where λ = βε denotes the MER [30], defined as the ratio of
average channel gain from the relay to the users to that from
the relay to the eavesdroppers.
Proof : See Appendix II.
It follows from Theorem 2 that we can obtain the asymptotic
secrecy outage probability with high MER for criterion I as
P asyout,m∗,n∗ =

KM
λM
[
(γth − 1)ηβ
δα
+
γth
δ
]M
, If N = 1
KM
λM
(
(γth − 1)ηβ
δα
)M
, If N ≥ 2
,
(52)
where δ = 0.5 and δ = 1 correspond to asymptotic expressions
derived from the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy outage
probability, respectively. Inspired by the asymptotic expression
from either lower or upper bound of the secrecy outage
probability, we find that the diversity order for criterion I is
equal to M . Hence, we can conclude from the squeeze theorem
that the diversity order for criterion I is equal to M , regardless
of the number of users and eavesdroppers. Moreover, the
asymptotic secrecy outage probability is irrespective of the
number of users when N ≥ 2, indicating that no gain is
achieved from increasing the number of users with high MER.
This is due to the fact that when N ≥ 2, the first hop from
the BS to the relays becomes the bottleneck for the dual-hop
data transmission.
B. Criterion II and III
To derive the asymptotic secrecy outage probability for
criterion II and III, we first give the asymptotic CDFs of um∗
and vm∗,n∗ in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: The asymptotic CDFs of um∗ and vm∗,n∗ are
Fum∗ (x) '

(1 +
ρβ
α
)M−1
ρβ
α
xM
(ρβ)M
, If N = 1
xM
αM
, If N ≥ 2
,
(53)
Fvm∗,n∗ (x) '

(1 +
ρβ
α
)M−1
xM
βM
, If N = 1
MN
M +N − 1
ρM−1xM+N−1
αM−1βN
, If N ≥ 2
.
(54)
Proof : See Appendix III.
7We then derive the CDFs of Zbm∗,n∗ from (50) as
FZb
m∗,n∗
(z) = Pr
[
δmin
(
um∗
(γth − 1)η ,
vm∗,n∗
γth
)
< z
]
(55)
= 1− Pr
(
um∗ ≥ (γth − 1)ηz
δ
)
× Pr
(
vm∗,n∗ ≥ γthz
δ
)
. (56)
Applying the results of Theorem 3 into the above equation
yields the asymptotic CDF of Zbm∗,n∗ as
FZb
m∗,n∗
(z) '

µ1(
z
δβ
)M , If N = 1
µ21(
z
δβ
)M + µ22(
z
δβ
)M+N−1, If N ≥ 2
,
(57)
with
µ1 = (1 +
ρβ
α
)M−1
[
ρβ
α
(
(γth − 1)η
ρ
)M
+ γMth
]
µ21 =
βM
αM
((γth − 1)η)M
µ22 =
MN
M +N − 1(
ρβ
α
)M−1γM+N−1th
.
(58)
By applying the asymptotic CDF of Zbm∗,n∗ into (46) and then
solving the resultant equation, we can obtain the asymptotic
secrecy outage probability with high MER for criterion II and
III as,
P asyout,m∗,n∗ '

µ1Γ(M +K)
Γ(K)
1
(δλ)M
, If N = 1
µ21Γ(M +K)
Γ(K)
1
(δλ)M
+
µ22Γ(M +N +K − 1)
Γ(K)
× 1
(δλ)M+N−1
, If N ≥ 2
.
(59)
where ρ = ρII and ρ = ρIII correspond to the asymptotic
secrecy outage probabilities of criterion II and III, respectively,
and δ = 0.5 and δ = 1 correspond to the asymptotic
expressions derived from the upper and lower bounds of
the secrecy outage probability, respectively. Note that when
N ≥ 2, the first term on the right hand side (RHS) of (59)
will dominate with large MER, while the second term will
become marginal. Hence we can conclude from the squeeze
theorem that for criterion II and III, the system diversity order
is also equal to M , regardless of the number of users and
eavesdroppers. Moreover, the first term in RHS of (59) is
irrespective of the number of users when N ≥ 2, indicating
that no gain can be achieved from increasing the number of
users with high MER. Once again this is due to the bottleneck
effect of the first hop from the BS to the relays when N ≥ 2.
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Fig. 2. Asymptotic secrecy outage probability versus MER.
VI. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical and simulation results
to verify the proposed studies. All the links in the system
experience Rayleigh flat fading. We adopt the pathloss model
with loss factor of four to determine the average channel gains.
The distance between the base station and the desired users
is set to unity. The relays are between the base station and
desired users, and the distance between the base station and
relays is denoted by D, so that α = D−4 and β = (1−D)−4.
In addition, we set a high transmit power at the base station
with PS = 30 dB, since we focus on the effect of MER on
the system secrecy outage probability.
Fig. 2 shows the asymptotic secrecy outage probability
versus MER, where D = 0.5, Rs = 0.2 bps/Hz, M = 2,
N = 2, and K = 2. As observed from this figure, the
asymptotic result from the lower bound of secrecy outage
probability has the same curve slope with that from the upper
bound. Moreover, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability
from the lower bound converges to the exact value, while that
from the upper bound is not tight even in high MER region. As
such, in the following, we only show the asymptotic secrecy
outage probability from the lower bound with δ = 1.
Fig. 3 demonstrates the effect of the number of relays on
the secrecy outage probability of criterion I, II, and III versus
MER, where D = 0.5, Rs = 0.2 bps/Hz, N = 2, K = 2, and
M varies from 1 to 3. For comparison, we plot the simulation
results of the three selection criteria as well as the optimal
selection performed in (11). As observed from the figure, we
can find that for different values of MER and M , the analytical
results for criterion I – III match well the simulation, which
validates the derived analytical expressions of the secrecy
outage probability in (35) and (47). In addition, the asymptotic
results converge with the exact at high MER, which verifies
the derived asymptotic expressions. Moreover, the slopes of
the curve of the secrecy outage probability are in parallel with
M , which verifies the system diversity order of M for all three
criteria. Further, criterion I achieves a comparable performance
to the optimal selection, and outperforms criterion II and
III. This is because criterion I performs the selection by
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MER: Criterion I.
incorporating both the main and eavesdropper links. Criterion
II exhibits better performance than criterion III, as the former
incorporates different impact from the two relay hops on the
system security. One can also find that the performance gap
between the three criteria increases with the number of relays.
Figs. 4 – 6 demonstrate the effect of the number of users
on the system secrecy outage probability, where M = 2,
K = 2, and N varies from 1 to 3. Specifically, Figs. 4 – 6
correspond to criterion I, II, and III, respectively. We find from
the figures that the system secrecy outage probability improves
with larger N , as more users help improve the link quality
of the relays to users. However, this improvement becomes
marginal for N ≥ 2 when MER is high, since the first hop
of the BS to relays becomes the bottleneck of the dual-hop
data transmission. Moreover, curves with different N share
the same slope, which indicates that users have no impact on
the system diversity order for each criterion.
Figs. 7 – 9 demonstrate the effect of the number of
eavesdroppers on the system secrecy outage probability versus
MER, where M = 2, N = 2, and K varies from 1 to 4. Specif-
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Fig. 5. Effect of number of users on the secrecy outage probability versus
MER: Criterion II.
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MER: Criterion III.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
10−8
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
MER (dB)
Se
cr
ec
y o
ut
ag
e 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
K=4
K=3
K=2
K=1
Simulation
Optimal selection:
Criterion I:   
Analysis
Simulation
Asymptotic
M=2,N=2
D=0.5,η=0.5
RS=0.2 bps/Hz
Fig. 7. Effect of number of eavesdroppers on the secrecy outage probability
versus MER: Criterion I.
90 5 10 15 20 25 30
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
MER (dB)
Se
cr
ec
y o
ut
ag
e 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
K=4
K=3
K=2
K=1
Criterion II:   
Analysis
Simulation
Asymptotic
M=2,N=2
D=0.5,η=0.5
RS=0.2 bps/Hz
Fig. 8. Effect of number of eavesdroppers on the secrecy outage probability
versus MER: Criterion II.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
MER (dB)
Se
cr
ec
y o
ut
ag
e 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
K=4
K=3
K=2
K=1
Criterion III:   
Analysis
Simulation
Asymptotic
M=2,N=2
D=0.5,η=0.5
RS=0.2 bps/Hz
Fig. 9. Effect of number of eavesdroppers on the secrecy outage probability
versus MER: Criterion III.
ically, Figs. 7 – 9 are associated with criterion I, II, and III,
respectively. As observed from these three figures, we can find
that the system secrecy outage probability deteriorates with
larger K, as more eavesdroppers help strengthen the link of
the relays to eavesdroppers. We see that curves with different
values of K have the same slope, indicating that the system
diversity order is independent of the number of eavesdroppers.
Moreover, the analytical results match well with the simulation
for different values of K, and the asymptotic results converge
with the exact at high MER. This further verifies the derived
analytical expressions for the secrecy outage probability as
well as the asymptotic expressions for each criterion.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed relay selection to secure the
physical layer communication in multiuser cooperative re-
lay networks with multiple amplify-and-forward (AF) relays,
against the wiretap channel with multiple eavesdroppers. We
presented three selection criteria to select the best relay and
user pair, in order to strengthen the network security. For
each of the three criteria, we derived analytical expressions
for the secrecy outage probability with large transmit power.
We also derived the asymptotic analysis for the secrecy outage
probability with high MER. An interesting conclusion is that
the system diversity order is equal to the number of relays,
regardless of the selection criterion. The diversity order is also
independent of the number of users and eavesdroppers.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The CDF of um∗ is defined as
Fum∗ (x) = Pr(um∗ < x) (A.1)
=
M∑
m=1
Pr[um < x,min(um, ρvm,n∗m)
> max
m1=1,··· ,M,m1 6=m
min(um1 , ρvm1,n∗m1 )]. (A.2)
Due to the symmetry, we can rewrite Fum∗ (x) as
Fum∗ (x) =M Pr[u1 < x,min(u1, ρv1,n∗1 ) > θ], (A.3)
where θ = maxm=2,··· ,M min(um, ρvm,n∗m). The CDF of
θ is equivalent to the (M − 1)-th power of the CDF of
min(um, ρvm,n∗m), given by
Fθ(θ) =
[
1−
N∑
n=1
(−1)n−1
(
N
n
)
e−(
1
α+
n
ρβ )θ
]M−1
(A.4)
=
∑˜
i
die
−eiθ, (A.5)
where
∑˜
i, di and ei are defined in (39). By setting Fθ(θ)
derivative with respect to θ, we can obtain the PDF of θ as
fθ(θ) = −
∑˜
i
dieie
−eiθ. (A.6)
Then, we further derive Fum∗ (x) from (A.3) as
Fum∗ (x) =M Pr
(
θ < u1 < x, v1,n∗1 >
θ
ρ
, 0 < θ < x
)
(A.7)
=M
∫ x
0
fθ(θ)
[∫ x
θ
fu1(u1)du1
∫ ∞
θ
ρ
fv1,n∗1 (v1)
dv1
]
dθ.
(A.8)
Applying the PDFs of θ, u1 and v1,n∗1 into the above equation
leads to the CDF of um∗ , as shown in (37) of Theorem 1.
Similarly, we derive the CDF of vm∗,n∗ as
Fvm∗,n∗ (x) = Pr(vm∗,n∗ < x) (A.9)
=
M∑
m=1
Pr
[
vm,n∗m < x,min(um, ρvm,n∗m)
> max
m1=1,··· ,M,m1 6=m
min(um1 , ρvm1,n∗m1 )
]
(A.10)
=M Pr[v1,n∗1 < x,min(u1, ρv1,n∗1 ) > θ].
(A.11)
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Note that the condition of v1,n∗1 < x and min(u1, ρv1,n∗1 ) > θ
can be written as u1 > θ, v1,n∗1 >
θ
ρ and v1,n∗1 < x, which is
equivalent to u1 > θ, θρ < v1,n∗1 < x and 0 < θ < ρx. Hence,
we can further write Fvm∗,n∗ (x) as
Fvm∗,n∗ (x) =M Pr
(
u1 > θ,
θ
ρ
< v1,n∗1 < x, 0 < θ < ρx
)
(A.12)
=M
∫ ρx
0
fθ(θ)
[∫ ∞
θ
fu1(u1)du1
∫ x
θ
ρ
fv1,n∗1
(v1)dv1
]
dθ.
(A.13)
By applying the PDFs of θ, u1 and v1,n∗1 into the above
equation, we can obtain the CDF of vm∗,n∗ , as shown in (37)
of Theorem 1. Hence, we complete the proof of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
For Zbm,n∗m in (50), we derive its CDF as
FZb
m,n∗m
(z) = Pr
[
δmin
(
um
(γth − 1)η ,
vm,n∗m
γth
)
< z
]
(B.1)
= 1− Pr
[
min
(
um
(γth − 1)η ,
vm,n∗m
γth
)
≥ z
δ
]
(B.2)
= 1− Pr
(
um ≥ (γth − 1)ηz
δ
)
× Pr
(
vm,n∗m ≥
γthz
δ
)
. (B.3)
Applying the PDFs of um and vm,n∗m into the above equation
yields the CDF of Zbm,n∗m as
FZb
m,n∗m
(z) = 1−
N∑
n=1
(−1)n−1
(
N
n
)
e−[
(γth−1)η
δα +
nγth
δβ ]z.
(B.4)
Similar to eqs. (32)-(33), we can obtain the asymptotic ex-
pression of Pout,m,n∗m as
Pout,m,n∗m '
1
Γ(K)εK
∫ ∞
0
FZb
m,n∗m
(w)wK−1e−
w
ε dw (B.5)
= 1− 1
Γ(K)εK
N∑
n=1
(−1)n−1
(
N
n
)
×
∫ ∞
0
wK−1e−(
1
ε+
(γth−1)η
δα +
nγth
δβ )wdw (B.6)
= 1−
N∑
n=1
(−1)n−1
(
N
n
)(
1 +
(γth − 1)ηε
δα
+
nγthε
δβ
)−K
(B.7)
Applying the series approximation of (1 + x)−1 ' 1 − x
for small value of |x|, we can further obtain the asymptotic
expression of Pout,m,n∗m with high MER as
P asyout,m,n∗m =
K
λδ
(
(γth − 1)ηβ
α
+
N∑
n=1
(−1)n−1
(
N
n
)
nγth
)
(B.8)
=

K
λ
[
(γth − 1)ηβ
δα
+
γth
δ
]
, If N = 1
K
λ
(γth − 1)ηβ
δα
, If N ≥ 2
,
(B.9)
where we apply [32, (0.154.2)] in the last equality. Hence, the
proof of Theorem 2 is completed.
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
By applying the series approximation of e−x ' 1 − x for
small value of |x| into (A.4), we obtain the asymptotic CDF
of θ with small value of |θ| as
Fθ(θ) '

(
1
α
+
1
ρβ
)M−1θM−1, If N = 1
θM−1
αM−1
, If N ≥ 2
. (C.1)
Then the asymptotic PDF of θ is given by
fθ(θ) '

(M − 1)( 1
α
+
1
ρβ
)M−1θM−2, If N = 1
(M − 1) θ
M−2
αM−1
, If N ≥ 2
.
(C.2)
From (A.8), we can derive the asymptotic Fum∗ (x) as
Fum∗ (x) =M
∫ x
0
fθ(θ)
[∫ x
θ
fu1(u1)du1
∫ ∞
θ
ρ
fv1,n∗1
(v1)dv1
]
dθ
(C.3)
'M
∫ x
0
fθ(θ)(e−
θ
α − e− xα )dθ (C.4)
' M
α
∫ x
0
fθ(θ)(x− θ)dθ. (C.5)
By applying the asymptotic expression of fθ(θ) in (C.2) into
the above equation, we can arrive at the asymptotic expression
of Fum∗ (x), as shown in (53) of Theorem 3.
In a similar way, we can derive the asymptotic expression
of Fvm∗,n∗ (x) by applying (C.2) into (A.13). The result is
shown in (54) of Theorem 3. In this way, we have completed
the proof of Theorem 3.
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